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You Be the Judge: Analyzing When
the Federal Arbitration Act’s
Judicial Review Standards Apply in
State Court
Max Birmingham*
I.

Introduction
This article addresses whether, when the Federal
Arbitration Act (“FAA”) governs an arbitration, the FAA’s
judicial review standards apply in state court and preempt
application of different state law judicial review standards.
There is a 5–5 split between states on this issue
because one state has flipflopped. 1 Two states have
explicitly held the FAA’s judicial review standards apply in
state court, two have indicated they will rule this way if the
issue were presented to them, and five states have taken the
opposite view. 2 The remaining state, Alabama, switched
sides. 3 In Birmingham News Co. v. Horn, the Supreme
Court of Alabama initially held that the FAA’s judicial

* B.S., State University of New York at Empire State College; M.B.A.,
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Michigan State University College of Law. The Author would like to thank
Maria Filipakis; Taylor O’Neil Connor, Public Defenders Office 18th Circuit,
Florida; and last but certainly not least, the editors, staff, & faculty advisor of
the Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal.
1
See discussion infra Part V (states that have held that the FAA does govern
judicial review standards in state court are: Georgia, Idaho, Nebraska, New
York, and South Carolina; states that have held that the FAA does not govern
judicial review standards in state court are: Alabama, California, Kentucky,
South Carolina, and Texas).
2
Id.
3
Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Honea, 55 So. 3d 1161, 1168–69 (Ala.
2010) (overruling Birmingham News Co. v. Horn, 901 So. 2d 27, 46 (Ala.
2004)).
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review standards apply in the aforementioned instances. 4
The court backtracked on this in Raymond James Financial
Services, Inc. v. Honea, where it was persuaded by the
Supreme Court of the United States (hereinafter “SCOTUS”
or “the U.S. Supreme Court” or “the Court”) in Hall Street
Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc. to rethink its stance.5 The
Supreme Court of Alabama described that the ruling in Hall
Street Associates, L.L.C. held that the FAA’s judicial review
standards are “procedural” rules, not substantive rules.6 The
other courts that held that state law preempts the FAA
judicial review standards have also done so under the notion
that the FAA’s judicial review standards are procedural rules,

901 So. 2d at 46, overruled by Horton Homes, Inc. v. Shaner, 999 So. 2d 462
(Ala. 2008), and Hereford v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 13 So. 3d 375 (Ala. 2009).
5
Honea, 55 So. 3d at 1168–69 (citing Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.,
552 U.S. 576 (2008)). “We are accordingly at liberty to decide whether to apply
§ 10 in state court proceedings on motions to vacate or to confirm an arbitration
award. We have heretofore done so; however, this case presents us with the
situation we implicitly recognized in Horn in which there are good and
sufficient reasons ‘to retreat from that position.’” Id. (emphasis added)
(citations omitted).
6
Honea, 55 So. 3d at 1168.
In Horn, we made clear that Alabama courts should
apply § 10 of the FAA when moved to vacate or to
confirm arbitration awards, even though § 10 was
facially applicable only to federal district courts. 901
So.2d at 46. However, we refrained from holding that §
10 constituted substantive law that we were required by
the FAA to apply in state court proceedings, stating that
it was unnecessary to “stumble over the distinction
between substantive law and procedural law” because
we had already adopted § 10 “as applicable to an appeal
of an arbitration award in this state, and we see no need
to retreat from that position.” 901 So.2d at 46–47.
However, in Hall Street, the Supreme Court of the
United States acknowledged that state statutory or
common law might permit arbitration awards to be
reviewed under standards different from those
enumerated in § 10, thus effectively stating that § 10
represents procedural as opposed to substantive law.
Id. (emphasis added).
4
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not substantive rules, and that they do not apply in state court
or preempt the application in state court of different state law
judicial review standards.7 These courts concluded that the
FAA’s substantive objective is to ensure the enforcement of
the arbitration agreement, and the courts asserted that this
objective purportedly is not frustrated by applying different
state law judicial review standards to the arbitration award.8
Notwithstanding, it is not clear where in the Hall Street
Associates, L.L.C. opinion the Court delineates that the FAA
judicial review standards are procedural rules, not
substantive rules.9
States that are hostile to arbitration undermine FAA
governed arbitration agreements by mandating more
stringent judicial review of arbitration awards than the FAA
authorizes, which is problematic. 10 State courts are more
frequently called upon to apply the FAA. 11 Thus, an
arbitration may have wildly different outcomes based upon
the state in which it is adjudicated. The FAA’s substantive
goal is to prevent hostile states from undercutting
enforcement of arbitration agreements. 12 As matters
currently stand, this goal is frustrated.
This argument proceeds as follows: Part I provides
an introduction. Part II analyzes the procedural reform intent
of the FAA and why the statute seeks to standardize the
arbitration process. Part III reviews the judicial review of
arbitration awards as promulgated in Hall Street Associates,
L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc. Part IV reviews the generations of
FAA cases which have been held to be preempted by
See discussion infra Part V.C.ii (discussing the Supreme Court of California’s
decision in Cable Connection, Inc. v. DirecTV, Inc., 190 P.3d 586 (2008)).
8
See, e.g., Henderson v. Summerville Ford-Mercury, 405 S.C. 440, 450 (2013).
9
See Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C., 552 U.S. 576; see also Matthew J. Brown, Final
Awards Reconceptualized: A Proposal to Resolve the Hall Street Circuit Split,
13 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 325, 326 (2013) (“The FAA does not grant courts
the authority to review the merits of an arbitrator’s decision.”).
10
Id. at 593 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
11
Nitro-Lift Techs., LLC v. Howard, 568 U.S. 17, 17–18 (2012) (per curiam).
12
Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C., 552 U.S. at 593 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
7
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SCOTUS. Part V examines the caselaw and explores the
reasoning behind the decisions. Part VI states public policy
purposes as to why the FAA’s judicial review standards
apply in state court when the FAA governs an arbitration.
Part VII identifies why not applying FAA judicial review
standards to an arbitration when the FAA governs is subject
to reductio ab absurdum. Part VIII concludes.
II.
“Procedural Reform” Intent of the Federal
Arbitration Act
History indicates that the FAA is part of a push for
procedural reform. 13 Before the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure were adopted in 1938, federal courts would
employ state court procedures. 14 However, this was a
disheveled endeavor, which led to widespread discrepancies
in the law. 15 The Conformity Act of 1872 attempted to
create uniform standards for procedure amongst the federal
courts. 16 Woefully, it did not achieve its objective, as
procedures in federal courts varied greatly amongst the
states.17 Some states employed common law pleadings but
varied as with or without statutory modifications.18 Other
states utilized code systems of procedures.19 This led to a
sundry of federal procedures, which all differed according to
state.20

Imre S. Szalai, Exploring the Federal Arbitration Act Through the Lens of
History, 2016 J. DISP. RESOL. 115, 119 (2016).
14
4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE 15 n.19 (3rd ed. 1998).
15
Id. at 16.
16
Conformity Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 196, 197 (1872)
(repealed by the adoption of the Fed. R. Civ. P. 28 U.S.C.A.).
17
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS
382–83 (8th ed. 2017); see also Nudd v. Burrows, 91 U.S. 426, 441 (1875) (The
Conformity Act failed to “bring about uniformity in the law of procedure in the
Federal and State courts of the same locality.”).
18
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 14, at 16.
19
Id.
20
Id.
13
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There were further numerous issues that muddled
what was appropriate and what was not.21 If there were a
federal statute on point, state practice would not be adhered
to.22 Moreover, state practice did not control certain matters,
such as jurisdiction and validity of service of process. 23
Furthermore, federal judges were not bound by state practice
in their administration of trial and appellate procedure. 24
Even more broadly, federal judges did not have to follow
state practice, causing major discontent with procedure.25 A
report from the Committee on Uniformity of Procedure and
Comparative Law of the American Bar Association (“ABA”)
poignantly stated that “a lawyer practicing in the Federal
courts, even in his own state, feels no more certainty as to
the proper procedure than if he were before a tribunal of a
foreign country.”26
Lawyer Thomas W. Shelton promoted “wellorganized propaganda” for the U.S. Supreme Court to
regulate judicial procedure in federal courts. 27 Shelton
elaborated that procedural uniformity was paramount to
achieving equal application of the law.28 At the 1911 ABA
annual meeting, Shelton formally introduced a resolution for
the U.S. Supreme Court to create a uniform system of
procedure for lower federal courts.29 In 1912, the ABA’s

WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 17, at 382.
Id.
23
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 14, at 16 n.22.
24
Id.
25
WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 17, at 382.
26
American Bar Association, Report of Committee on Uniformity of Procedure
and Comparative Law, 19 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 411, 420 (1896).
27
Thomas Wall Shelton, Uniform Judicial Procedure–Let Congress Set the
Supreme Court Free, 73 CENT. L.J. 319, 319 (1911) [hereinafter Uniform
Judicial Procedure].
28
Thomas Wall Shelton, The Relation of Judicial Procedure to Uniformity of
Law, 72 CENT. L.J. 114, 114 (1911); Uniform Judicial Procedure, supra note
27, at 319–20; see also Thomas Wall Shelton, Simplification of Legal
Procedure-Expediency Must Not Sacrifice Principle, 71 CENT. L.J. 330 (1910).
29
See 36 A.B.A. REP. 50 (1911). The resolution provided:
21
22
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Committee on Judicial Administration and Remedial
Procedure recommended the adoption of Shelton’s
resolution.30 The motion passed, and the ABA Committee
on Uniform Judicial Procedure was created and led by
Shelton along with four other individuals.31 The Committee
collaborated with the U.S. Congress and presented the bill in
both houses.32
In 1923 and 1924, there were congressional
hearings regarding the bills, which would become the
FAA. 33 In 1925, the U.S. Congress enacted the United
WHEREAS, Section 914 of the Revised Statutes [the Conformity Act
of 1872] has utterly failed to bring about a general uniformity in
federal and state proceedings in civil cases; and
WHEREAS, It is believed that the advantages of state remedies can
be better obtained by a permanent uniform system, with the
necessary rules of practice prepared by the United States Supreme
Court;
Now, therefore, be it, and, it is Hereby resolved:
First: That a complete uniform system of law pleading should
prevail in the federal and state courts;
Second: That a system for use in the federal courts, and as a model,
with all necessary rules of practice or provisions therefor, should be
prepared and put into effect by the Supreme Court of the United
States;
Third: That to this end, See. 914 and all other conflicting provisions
of the Revised Statutes should be repealed and appropriate statutes
enacted;
Fourth: That for the purpose of presenting these resolutions to
Congress and otherwise advocating the same in every legitimate
manner, there shall be appointed a committee of five members to be
selected by the President to be known as “The Committee on
Uniform Judicial Procedure.”
37 A.B.A. REP. 434–35 (1912).
30
Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 UNIV. PA. L. REV.
1015, 1049–50 (1982).
31
Id. at 1050. See 37 A.B.A. REP. 35–36 (1912). The five individuals first
appointed to the committee were Shelton, Louis D. Brandeis, J.M. Dickinson,
Williams B. Hornblower, and Joseph N. Teal.
32
Burbank, supra note 30, at 1050; H.R. 26,462, 62d Cong. (1912); S. 8454,
62d Cong. (1912), reprinted in 38 A.B.A. REP. 542 (1913).
33
IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION,
NATIONALIZATION, INTERNATIONALIZATION 88, 92 (1992) (citing Sales and
Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Federal
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States Arbitration Act, which would become known as the
FAA. 34 The bills were enacted into law with minor
amendments. 35 This was a watershed moment—before it
was enacted, “agreements to arbitrate future disputes were
almost always unenforceable in the United States.”36 The
main crux of the statute is § 2, which declares that an
arbitration agreement is “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.”37
In a dissenting opinion, Justice O’Connor posited
that Congress enacted the FAA “specifically to rectify
forum-shopping problems created by this Court’s decision in
Swift v. Tyson.”38 In another case, Justice Thomas issued a
dissenting opinion and took a different view and held that
Swift was not influencing the federal courts. 39 Rather,
Justice Thomas took the perspective that federal courts did
not apply state arbitration statutes because they were not
considered to be substantive law.40 Hence, the forum’s laws,
for example, federal laws in district courts, governed.41 This
created a conundrum because federal courts did not
consistently apply state arbitration laws.42 This remained an
Commercial Arbitration: Hearing on S. 4213 and 4214 Before the Subcomm.
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. (1923) [hereinafter 1923
Hearings]; Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Joint Hearings on S.
1005 and H.R. 646 Before the Subcomms. of the Comms. on the Judiciary, 68th
Cong. 7 (1924) [hereinafter 1924 Hearings]).
34
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012). The federal statute was
first called the “United States Arbitration Act.” 43 Stat. 883, ch. 213, § 14.
35
MACNEIL, supra note 33, at 84–91.
36
1 IAN R. MACNEIL, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL & THOMAS J. STIPANOWICH,
FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS, AWARDS, AND REMEDIES UNDER
THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT § 4.1.2 (Supp. 1999).
37
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
38
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 34 (1984).
39
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 288 (1995) (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
40
Id.
41
Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 1–2 (1842).
42
See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 288 (1995)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Their refusal was not the outgrowth of this Court’s
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issue until 1956 when SCOTUS ruled that rules regarding
enforcing arbitration agreements are substantive law.43
In 1924, Alexander Rose of the Arbitration Society
of America also provided Congressional testimony
advocating for uniformity.44 Rose stated that enacting the
FAA would allow disputes to be heard on the merits by a
subject matter expert and be “free from technicalities.” 45
This was a major issue at the time.46 Rose explained:
[T]he need of the hour is what? It is to simplify legal
matters. They have become too burdensome in many
respects. People are dissatisfied with the courts. I mean no
disrespect to the courts, because what I may say has been
very much more forcibly expressed by Chief Justice Taft,
who expressed much more vigorously the same sentiment.47
During debate about enacting the FAA, there was
vibrant discussion about an amount in controversy
requirement to bring forth a claim.48 Those who favored a
controversy amount requirement suggested $3,000, which
matched the applicable threshold in other federal suits. 49
decision in Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1 (1842), which held that certain categories
of state judicial decisions were not ‘laws’ for purposes of the Rules of Decisions
Act and hence were not binding in federal courts; even under Swift, state
statutes unambiguously constituted ‘laws.’ Rather, federal courts did not apply
the state arbitration statutes because the statutes were not
considered substantive laws.”).
43
See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 201 (holding that a
stay in proceedings applies to arbitration agreements covered by Sections 1 and
2 of the Act.).
44
MACNEIL, supra note 33, at 96.
45
1924 Hearings, supra note 33, at 27.
46
S. REP. NO. 1174, 1–2 (1926); see also H. H. Nordlinger, Law and Arbitration,
30 COM. L. LEAGUE J. 621, 624 (1925) (“When justice can best be done by a
judge who appeals to counsel not to insist too rigorously on the undisputed rules
of evidence, it is certainly time to think of changing these rules.”); Stephen N.
Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 909, 945 (1987)
(“[L]awyers took advantage of procedural technicalities, that stood in the way
of justice.”).
47
1924 Hearings, supra note 33, at 13.
48
See generally id.
49
Szalai, supra note 13, at 120.
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Julius H. Cohen articulated his concern about the amount in
controversy requirement gaining momentum in Congress in
a letter to Charles L. Bernheimer.50 Cohen was concerned
with the prospect of federal courts being flooded with FAA
cases.51 Cohen and Bernheimer strategized to argue that it
would be too arduous to ascertain the appropriate threshold
amount. 52 Nonetheless, they agreed that if politicians
insisted on an amount, they would recommend $3,000 as the
threshold.53
During testimony, Cohen articulated that the
arbitration laws are part of a broader procedural reform
movement meant to create uniformity. 54 As part of the
broader procedural reform movement, a Senate report
stressed the importance of uniformity:
First, to make uniform throughout the United States
the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions and the
practice and procedure in the district courts in actions at law.
It is believed that if this were its only advantage that [sic]
lawyers and litigants would find, in uniformity alone, a
tremendous advance over the present system.
Second, these general rules, if wisely made, would
be a long step toward simplicity, a most desirable step in
view of the chaotic and complicated condition which now
exists.
Third, it would tend toward the speedier and more
intelligent disposition of the issues presented in law actions
and toward a reduction in the expense of litigation.
Fourth, it would make it more certain that if a
plaintiff has a cause of action he would not be turned out of
court upon a technicality and without a trial upon the very
merits of the case; and, likewise, if the defendant had a just
Id.
Id.
52
Id. at 120–21.
53
Id.
54
1923 Hearings, supra note 33, at 8.
50
51
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defense he would not be denied by any artifice of [sic] the
opportunity to present it.55
Judicial standards of review are a cornerstone of law.
Judge Harry Pregerson proclaimed that ignoring standards
of review is one of the seven sins of appellate brief writing.56
In federal courts, it is an indispensable part of every
appellate decision. 57 Standard of review is based on and
defines how much deference will be granted to the lower
court or tribunal’s decision.58 Moreover, there are varying
levels within each of the standards of review. 59 The
American Bar Association stated that “standards of review
constitute the most important factor in a preliminary
assessment of prospects for a reversal.”60
If part of the intent of the FAA is to provide
uniformity,61 then it follows that the FAA’s judicial review
standards apply in state court and preempt application of
different state law judicial review standards. If states are
free to enact laws that set their own standards for judicial
review of claims brought under the FAA, it would lead to
chaos as uneven application of the law will undoubtedly
ensue.62 The application of such disparity in the law would
S. REP. NO. 1174, at 1–2 (1926).
Harry Pregerson, The Seven Sins of Appellate Brief Writing and Other
Transgressions, 34 UCLA L. REV. 431, 437 (1986).
57
Patrick W. Brennan, Standards of Appellate Review, 33 DEF. L.J. 377 (1984),
reprinted in DANIEL J. MEADOR, MAURICE ROSENBURG, & PAUL D.
CARRINGTON, APPELLATE COURTS: STRUCTURES, FUNCTIONS, PROCESSES,
AND PERSONNEL 196 (1994).
58
DANIEL SOLOMON, MARY CALKINS, & MATT HICKS, IDENTIFYING AND
UNDERSTANDING STANDARDS OF REVIEW 1-2 (Julia Rugg ed., Writing Ctr.
Geo. Univ. L. Ctr., 2019); see The Writing Center, Identifying and
Understanding Standards of Review, GEO. U. L. CENTER, 1, 1–2 (2019),
https://www.law.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Identifyingand-Understanding-Standards-of-Review.pdf.
59
STEVEN A. CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF
REVIEW § 4.01, at 4–5 (3d ed. 1999).
60
BRENDON ISHIKAWA & DANA L. CURTIS, APPELLATE MEDIATION: A
GUIDEBOOK FOR ATTORNEYS AND MEDIATORS (A.B.A. 2016).
61
See 1923 Hearings, supra note 33, at 8.
62
See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 14, at 16 n.22.
55
56
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be impacted by state’s views on arbitration. For instance,
“states that are hostile to arbitration [may] undermine FAAgoverned arbitration agreements by mandating more
stringent judicial review of arbitration awards” than the FAA
authorizes.63
III.
Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards
In Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel Inc., the
U.S. Supreme Court decided whether a federal court can
enforce a clause in an arbitration agreement that provides for
more expansive review of an arbitration award than is
otherwise provided in §§ 10 and 11 of the FAA. 64 This case
resolved a split amongst the Federal Courts of
Appeal.65 Some courts interpreted the decision in Wilko v.
Swan66 as adding “manifest disregard of the law” as another
ground for vacating an arbitrator’s award.67
The arbitration agreement in Hall Street Associates,
L.L.C. permitted the federal court to vacate, modify, or
correct the arbitrator’s award “(i) where the arbitrator’s
findings of facts are not supported by substantial evidence,
or (ii) where the arbitrator’s conclusions of law are

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 2, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Maryland,
123 A.3d 660 (Ct. Spec. App. 2014) (No. 15-1537), 2016 WL 3476557, at *2.
64
Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 590–91 (2008).
65
Id. at 583.
66
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
67
Christopher R. Drahozal, Codifying Manifest Disregard, 8 NEV. L.J. 234, 235
n. 11 (2008); see also James M. Gaitis, “Unraveling the Mystery of Wilko v.
Swan: American Arbitration Vacatur Law and the Accidental Demise of Party
Autonomy, 7 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 1, 2–3 (2007) (“Interestingly, the errors in
legal analysis respectively committed first by the Supreme Court and then by
the federal courts not only differ in highly significant ways but also came about
for entirely different reasons. The only material error in the Supreme Court's
analysis was occasioned by a seemingly inadvertent mischaracterization of a
single aspect of traditional American arbitration vacatur law, whereas the errors
in the reasoning of subsequent federal appellate court decisions, and in the
rationale for the "doctrine" of manifest disregard of the law as we know it, result
from an unduly dogmatic analysis in which the normal investigative tools of
historical inquiry and case law consideration were neglected in favor of the
peremptory application of a nonexistent policy.”).
63
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erroneous.”68 Hall Street argued that if courts could add to
the statutory reasons for vacating an award, parties could
provide for additional reasons in an arbitration contract.69
SCOTUS rejected this argument and held that
parties may not alter the scope of review provided for by the
statute.70 The Court proclaimed that the statutory grounds
for vacatur and modification of an arbitrator’s award, as set
forth in §§ 10 and 11 of the FAA, are exclusive and may not
be expanded by contract. 71 The Court cited three main
textual bases for limiting judicial review of arbitration
awards under the FAA.72
First, the court cited the ejusdem generis (“of the
same kinds, class, or nature”) canon of construction.73 The
Court misapplies the canon. Scalia & Garner elucidate when
ejusdem generis applies:
The ejusdem generis canon applies when a drafter
has tacked on a catchall phrase at the end of an enumeration
of specifics, as in dogs, cats, horses, cattle, and other
animals. Does the phrase and other animals refer to wild
animals as well as domesticated ones? What about a
horsefly? What about protozoa? Are we to read other
animals here as meaning other similar animals? The
principle of ejusdem generis says just that: It implies the
addition of similar after the word other.74
Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C., 552 U.S. at 579.
Id. at 585–86 (“Second, Hall Street says that the agreement to review for legal
error ought to prevail simply because arbitration is a creature of contract, and
the FAA is ‘motivated, first and foremost, by a congressional desire to enforce
agreements into which parties ha[ve] entered.’ But to rest this case on the
general policy of treating arbitration agreements as enforceable as such would
be to beg the question, which is whether the FAA has textual features at odds
with enforcing a contract to expand judicial review following the arbitration.”)
(citations omitted).
70
Id. at 590.
71
Id. at 590–92.
72
Id. at 586–88.
73
Id. at 586.
74
ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION
OF LEGAL TEXTS 199 (2012).
68
69
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The Court does not cite a catchall phrase.75 Rather,
it combines terms from two sections and tries to infer
meaning, which is the noscitur a sociis canon of
construction.76 While the Court does come to the correct
conclusion that fraud and a mistake of law are not of the
same nature,77 the analysis is off point.
Second, the Court explained that § 9 does not
provide flexibility with regard to judicial confirmation. 78
Thus, when a party applies for a court order seeking
affirmation of an arbitration award, the court “must grant”
the order “unless the award is vacated, modified, or
corrected as prescribed in §§ 10 and 11” of the FAA.79 The
Court emphasized that the term “must grant” is unequivocal,
and it is not open for expansion when parties have an
agreement that is silent on the matter.80

Id. (citing 9 U.S.C. §§ 9, 10)
Max Birmingham, Whistle While You Work: Interpreting Retaliation
Remedies Available to Whistleblowers in the Dodd-Frank Act, 13 FLA. A&M
UNIV. L. REV. 1, 17 (2017) (“Noscitur a sociis is an associated-words canon
that means that a word is defined by the words surrounding it.”).
77
Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C., 552 U.S. at 586.
78
Id. at 577, 587.
79
Id. at 587 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 9).
80
Id. at 587, n.6.
75
76
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Third, the Court pointed to § 5 of the FAA, 81
articulating that it epitomizes a default provision. 82 The
Court contrasts “if no method be provided” from § 5 with
“must grant . . . unless” in § 9.83 This analogy is off base.
With regard to § 5, the statute goes on to lay out next steps
after “provided.” 84 With regard to § 9, the Court states
“[t]here is nothing malleable about ‘must grant,’” but it
leaves out the “unless” part. 85 Notwithstanding, while
“[t]here is nothing malleable about ‘must grant,’”86 there is
also nothing malleable about “shall be submitted to binding
arbitration before a panel of three neutral arbitrators.”
The relevant part of § 9 states “unless the award is
vacated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in
§§ 10 and 11 of this title.”87 Admittedly, the Court provided
contradictory reasoning after rejecting Hall Street’s
contentions that §§ 10 and 11 are not the exclusive grounds
for judicial review, and then conceded that it was “deciding
nothing about other possible avenues for judicial
9 U.S.C. § 5:
If in the agreement provision be made for a method of
naming or appointing an arbitrator or arbitrators or an
umpire, such method shall be followed; but if no method
be provided therein, or if a method be provided and any
party thereto shall fail to avail himself of such method,
or if for any other reason there shall be a lapse in the
naming of an arbitrator or arbitrators or umpire, or in
filling a vacancy, then upon the application of either
party to the controversy the court shall designate and
appoint an arbitrator or arbitrators or umpire, as the case
may require, who shall act under the said agreement with
the same force and effect as if he or they had been
specifically named therein; and unless otherwise
provided in the agreement the arbitration shall be by a
single arbitrator.
Id.
82
Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C., 552 U.S. at 587–88.
83
Id. at 588.
84
9 U.S.C. § 5.
85
Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C., 552 U.S. at 587.
86
Id.
87
9 U.S.C. § 9.
81
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enforcement of arbitration awards.” 88 In a terse dissent,
Justice Breyer pointed to the same reasoning as the majority
and trumpeted that the FAA does not “preclude” parties from
contracting alternative grounds for judicial review of an
arbitration award.89
In Hall Street Associates, L.L.C., SCOTUS did not
decide whether the FAA preempts state laws that permit
state courts to subject arbitration awards to different
standards of judicial review.90 As the Court has squarely
held, the FAA establishes “a national policy favoring
arbitration with just the limited review needed to maintain
arbitration’s essential virtue of resolving disputes
straightaway.91 The FAA’s policy of limited review is an
indispensable aspect of the FAA’s “policy . . . to ensure the
enforceability [of] . . . agreements to arbitrate.”92 Therefore,
when the FAA governs an arbitration, the FAA’s judicial
review standards apply in state court and preempt
application of different state law judicial review standards.

Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C., 552 U.S. at 590 (“In holding that §§ 10 and 11
provide exclusive regimes for the review provided by the statute, we do not
purport to say that they exclude more searching review based on authority
outside the statute as well. The FAA is not the only way into court for parties
wanting review of arbitration awards: they may contemplate enforcement
under state statutory or common law, for example, where judicial review of
different scope is arguable. But here we speak only to the scope of the
expeditious judicial review under §§ 9, 10, and 11, deciding nothing about other
possible avenues for judicial enforcement of arbitration awards.”) (emphasis
added).
89
Id. at 596 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Like the majority and Justice STEVENS,
and primarily for the reasons they set forth, I believe that the Act does
not preclude enforcement of such an agreement.”).
90
Id. at 590 (majority opinion) (“In holding that §§ 10 and 11 provide exclusive
regimes for the review provided by the statute, we do not purport to say that
they exclude more searching review based on authority outside the statute as
well.”).
91
Id. at 588 (emphasis added); see also Oxford Health Plans, LLC v. Sutter,
569 U.S. 564, 568 (2013).
92
Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. Trs. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476
(1989).
88
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IV.

Preemption
A.
First Generation
When SCOTUS was first confronted with FAA
preemption cases, the issues centered on state laws that
invalidated agreements to arbitrate. In Southland Corp. v.
Keating,93 SCOTUS held that state courts are bound by the
FAA, which preempts conflicting state law. 94 Southland
Corp. involved a dispute over an arbitration clause in a
franchise agreement.95 This case was delivered to the Court
via 28 U.S.C. § 1257, which provides for review of state
court decisions that implicate the validity of federal
statutes.96 The Court held that § 2 of the FAA “declared a
national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power
of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of
claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by
arbitration.”97
Chief Justice Burger’s majority opinion relied
extensively on the FAA’s legislative history. 98 This is
peculiar because there is scarce legislative history regarding
the FAA given that it was heavily developed outside of the
U.S. Congress, namely by the American Bar Association and
the New York Chamber of Commerce.99 While the Chief
Justice acknowledged that the legislative history was “not
without ambiguities,” he nevertheless arrived at the
conclusion that it provided “strong indications” that the FAA
applied in state court.100
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
Id. at 15–16.
Id. at 1.
96
Id. at 6.
97
Id. at 10 (emphasis added).
98
Id. at 25.
99
See generally IMRE S. SZALAI, OUTSOURCING JUSTICE: THE RISE OF
MODERN ARBITRATION LAWS IN AMERICA (Carolina Academic Press, 2013);
IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION,
NATIONALIZATION, INTERNATIONALIZATION (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1st ed. 1992).
100
Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 12.
93
94
95
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In a dissenting opinion, Justice O’Connor opined
that the majority decision was an “exercise in judicial
revisionism” that disregarded the “unambiguous” legislative
history of the FAA as a procedural statute applicable only in
federal court.101 Justice O’Connor stated that:
The foregoing cannot be dismissed as “ambiguities”
in the legislative history. It is accurate to say that the entire
history contains only one ambiguity, and that appears in the
single sentence of the House Report cited by the Court . . . .
That ambiguity, however, is definitively resolved elsewhere
in the same House Report . . . and throughout the rest of the
legislative history.102
It is beguiling that both the majority and the dissent
in Southland Corp. based their opinions on legislative
history. 103 It is well-established that when statutory
interpretation begins with “the language itself, the specific
context in which that language is used, and the broader
context of the statute as a whole,” 104 even textualists can
reach different conclusions when interpreting the same
text.105
Regardless of what the opinion is of the decision in
Southland Corp., it is still good law. Following the decision,
several courts tried to evade the ruling in Southland Corp.
by reading the term “involving commerce” in § 2 of the FAA
as requiring the parties to a contract with an arbitration
clause to have agreed to an interstate arrangement. 106 In
Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies v. Dobson, the Court
Id. at 36 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 29 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
103
Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 12.
104
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997).
105
JCB, Inc. v. Horsburgh & Scott Co., 912 F.3d 238, 242 (5th Cir. 2018) (Ho,
J., concurring) (“Judge Duncan and I emphatically agree that the proper
function of the judiciary is to construe statutory texts faithfully . . . . We
nevertheless reach different conclusions as to the particular text before us, as
textualists sometimes do.”).
106
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 269–70 (1995)
(collecting cases).
101
102

111
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rejected this argument and explicitly stated that Southland
Corp. is the correct interpretation of § 2.107
SCOTUS would go on to reinforce an extremely
broad interpretation of § 2, specifically the term “involving
commerce”. In Selma Medical Center, Inc. v. Fontenot, the
Court reversed the Supreme Court of Alabama and held that
an arbitration agreement between an Alabama lender and an
Alabama construction company did involve interstate
commerce.108
B.
Second Generation
The second generation of FAA preemption cases
that came before the Supreme Court are those involving state
laws that regulate the arbitration itself.109 Perhaps the most
notable second-generation case is AT & T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion.110 This case was about a consumer agreement
that mandated arbitration but prohibited class action claims.
While Concepcion acknowledges that they signed the
agreement, they pointed to the Discover Bank Rule.111 The
Discover Bank Rule, created by the Supreme Court of
California, refuses to enforce class action waivers on
unconscionability grounds when (1) the waiver is in a “take
it or leave it” consumer contract; (2) the waiver involves a
dispute with a predictably small amount of damages; and (3)
it is alleged that the party with superior bargaining power
engaged in a scheme to deliberately cheat consumers.112
Again, invoking the broad powers of § 2 of the FAA,
SCOTUS held that it preempted the Discover Bank Rule.113
Speaking through Justice Scalia, the Court cited obstacle

Id. at 265.
Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 53–54, 58 (2003) (per curium).
109
See generally Christopher R. Drahozal, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption,
79 IND. L.J. 393 (2004).
110
See generally AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
111
Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 333–35.
112
Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 160–63 (Cal. 2005).
113
See generally AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
107
108

112
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preemption114 as the reason why the McGill Rule should be
preempted because class actions obstruct the purpose of the
FAA. 115 Second, the opinion reasoned that the “principal
advantage” of arbitration is a robust process and informal
procedure. 116 If class actions are now introduced in
arbitration, this advantage would be lost. Another reason
cited is that because arbitration awards are hard to appeal,
“[a]rbitration . . . [is] poorly suited to the higher stakes of
class litigation.” 117 Third, SCOTUS elaborated that the
FAA permits parties to agree to class-wide arbitration and
that the FAA “requires courts to honor parties’
expectations.” 118 However, when the parties have not
contracted for class-wide arbitration, state law may not
require it.119
In Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, SCOTUS
was confronted with the issue as to whether a South Carolina
court rule permitting arbitration on a class-wide, rather than
individual, basis is preempted by the FAA.120 The majority
ended up avoiding the issue of preemption. 121 The Court
ended up vacating the lower court’s decision that allowed the
arbitrator to consider whether the contract precluded classFreightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995) (quoting Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (Under obstacle preemption, a state law is
preempted if it “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”).
115
Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 344 (“[r]equiring the availability of classwide
arbitration interferes with fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus creates
a scheme inconsistent with the FAA.”); see also Edward P. Boyle & David N.
Cinotti, Beyond Nondiscrimination: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion and the
Further Federalization of U.S. Arbitration Law, 12 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 373,
374 (2012) (“Of equal importance, Concepcion also expands the implicit
purposes of the FAA—by preempting the application of general state contract
defenses when those defenses conflict with fundamental attributes of arbitration
as envisioned in the FAA.”).
116
Id. at 348.
117
Id. at 350.
118
Id. at 351.
119
Id.
120
See generally Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
121
Id.
114

113
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wide arbitration.122 Three Justices dissented, stating that the
South Carolina rule is preempted because it is in conflict
with the FAA.123 In American Express Co. v. Italian Colors
Restaurant, SCOTUS vacated a state court decision
applying a novel theory to an arbitration agreement.124 In
this case, the parties entered into an agreement prohibiting
class-wide arbitration.125 Italian Colors opposed a motion to
compel arbitration because of the “effective vindication
theory” because the cost of litigating the claim would exceed
individual recovery. 126 SCOTUS rejected this argument,
cited Concepcion, and highlighted the informal procedure of
arbitration. 127 Again, SCOTUS reinforced the enormous
reach of § 2.
C.
Next Generation
At this time, it remains to be seen what the next
generation of arbitration cases decided by SCOTUS will
center on. There is a good chance that at some point,
SCOTUS will be faced with determining whether the FAA’s
judicial review standards apply in state court and preempt
application of different state law judicial review standards
when the FAA governs an arbitration. Based upon precedent
from the first generation and second-generation cases, and
the broad preemption powers given to § 2 of the FAA, it is
likely that SCOTUS will rule that states are not free to
determine their own judicial-review standards when
handling FAA cases.
V.
Current State of the Law

Id. at 454.
Green Tree Financial Corp., 539 U.S. at 455–60 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting).
124
American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 570 U.S. 228, 231–39
(2013).
125
Id. at 231.
126
Id. at 235.
127
Id. at 238 (citing AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 348
(2011)).
122
123

114
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A.
State Courts That Have Held That the
FAA Does Govern the Judicial Review Standard in State
Court
1. Georgia
In Hilton Constr. Co. v. Martin Mech. Contractors,
Inc., the Supreme Court of Georgia stated that one of the
questions presented is “whether the Superior Court of Clarke
County had jurisdiction to vacate an arbitration award made
under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 USCA § 1, et seq.; if so,
whether state or federal law should govern the vacation of
the award; and whether the failure of the arbitrator to add a
party to the arbitration was a ground for vacating the
award.”128
A dispute arose between the parties over the scope
of work included in a contract for heating, ventilating and air
conditioning services. 129 Hilton initially entered into a
contract with Hospital Authority of Clarke County for
renovations and additions to Athens General Hospital. 130
Subsequently, Hilton subcontracted out to various vendors,
including Martin Mechanical Contracts, Inc. (“Martin”).131
The dispute centered over who was responsible for steam
connection work.132 Martin ended up doing the work, albeit
under protest, and filed for arbitration for compensation
pursuant to the contract. 133 It is not stated whether the
contract had specified which arbitration rules applied. 134
Rather, the court noted that Martin obtained an arbitration
award pursuant to the FAA. 135 The Supreme Court of

Hilton Constr. Co. v. Martin Mech. Contractors, Inc., 308 S.E.2d 830, 831
(Ga. 1983) (emphasis added).
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
Id.
128

115
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Georgia upheld the lower court’s decision that the FAA was
applicable because state law must yield to federal law.136
The court narrowed the judicial review to apply
federal law in state court, and explicitly cited § 10 of the
FAA. 137 It is not definitive whether the court would have
held the same if § 11 of the FAA or an interpretation of the
Wilko v. Swan decision of “manifest disregard of the law”
were cited as the grounds for appealing the arbitration award.
2. Idaho
In Hecla Mining. Co. v. Bunker Hill Co., the parties
entered into a contractual agreement which stipulated that if
a dispute should arise, it shall be arbitrated under the rules of
the American Arbitration Association.138
While the court acknowledged that parties can
relinquish their rights to bring forth their claims in court, it
is arguable in this instance whether it was correct to use the
FAA instead of the AAA since the contract specified that
“any disagreement . . . shall be submitted to and determined
and settled by arbitration conducted by and under the rules
of the American Arbitration Association.”139 In Hall Street
Associates, L.L.C., SCOTUS left unresolved the question of
whether an agreement expressly providing for the
application of state law to the enforcement of the arbitration
agreement could override or displace the FAA. 140 Rather, in
Hall Street Associates, SCOTUS called it “arguable” that

Id. at 832 (“The transaction out of which the arbitration arose involved
commerce within the meaning of 9 USCA § 1. ‘Where such a transaction
involves commerce, within the meaning of the Federal Arbitration Statute, the
state law and policy with respect thereto must yield to the paramount federal
law.’”) (citations omitted).
137
Id. (“Since the Federal Arbitration Act created a body of substantive federal
law, if a state court has jurisdiction to vacate an award, federal law rather than
state law governs the vacation of the award.”).
138
Hecla Min. Co. v. Bunker Hill Co., 617 P.2d 861, 863 (Idaho 1980).
139
Id. at 863–65.
140
See generally Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008).
136

116
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parties could rely on state law as a basis to expand judicial
review.141
In Bunker Hill Co., the court decided that interstate
commerce was involved in the transaction, and thus the FAA
was the controlling authority.142 The court emphasized that
even if it personally did not agree with the arbitrator’s
decision or if it was sympathetic to the position of a party, it
was nevertheless bound by exceptionally narrow grounds for
review.143 The Supreme Court of Idaho articulated an even
more narrow interpretation of judicial review standards
under the FAA than other courts by stating that they are
essentially foreclosed from reviewing the merits. 144 The
court decided that when the FAA governs an arbitration in
state court, the FAA’s judicial review standards are
applicable.145
3. Nebraska (Dowd v. First Omaha Secs. Corp.,
495 N.W.2d 36, 41–42 (Neb. 1993))
In Dowd v. First Omaha Sec. Corp., the Supreme
Court of Nebraska held that a contract between the parties
directly involved interstate commerce which allowed the
FAA to apply.146 Plaintiffs Thomas F. Dowd and Barbara A.
Dowd brought suit against their stockbroker, First Omaha
Id. at 590.
Bunker Hill Co., 617 P.2d at 865 (“At the outset, we note that federal law
concerning the review of arbitrator’s awards applies since the underlying
factual situation here clearly concerns interstate commerce. 9 U.S.C. § 1.
Therefore, we utilize the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. and the
cases thereunder instead of Idaho’s enactment of the Uniform Arbitration Act,
I.C. § 7-901 et seq.”) (citations omitted).
143
Id. at 863–68.
144
Id. at 866–67 (“This expression by the Supreme Court has been seen as
essentially foreclosing judicial review of the merits of arbitration awards. As
later stated in Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., . . . ‘[Courts] should not
undertake to review the merits of arbitration awards but should defer to the
tribunal chosen by the parties finally to settle their disputes. Otherwise, ‘plenary
review by a court of the merits would make meaningless the provisions that the
arbitrator’s decision is final, for in reality it would almost never be final.’”)
(citations omitted).
145
Id. at 865.
146
Dowd v. First Omaha Sec. Corp., 495 N.W.2d 36, 39 (Neb. 1993).
141
142

117
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Securities, over liquidation of their margin accounts.147 The
contract cited by the court specifically held that Nebraska
law would govern.148 The court provided no analysis of the
interstate commerce holding. Rather, it is only mentioned
once: “As such, as required by §§ 1 and 2 of the FAA, it
directly involved interstate commerce.”149 The contract did
require that “any disputes arising from the agreement would
be submitted to arbitration.”150 While the dispute could have
been sent to arbitration, Nebraska could have governed the
dispute.151 But the Supreme Court of Nebraska rejected this.
Here, the court read “arbitration” and automatically held that
the FAA applied. Moreover, the court’s broad reading could
be interpreted to preempt all state arbitration law, as it cites
the Supremacy Clause. 152 Notwithstanding the court’s
analysis as to how it got to the FAA, it still held that when
the FAA governs an arbitration, all of its rules, including the
judicial review standards, apply.
4. New York
In U.S. Elecs., Inc. v. Sirius Satellite Radio, Inc., the
New York Court of Appeals gave a rather short opinion in
which it blazoned “[a]s this matter affects interstate
commerce, the vacatur of the arbitration award is governed

Id. at 37.
Id.
149
Id. at 39.
150
Id. at 37.
151
Id. at 40 (quoting MAPCO Ammonia Pipeline v. State Bd. of Equal., 238
Neb. 565 (1991)).
152
Id. at 38 (“In this case, the district court had no alternative but to grant a stay
pending arbitration. The FOS-Dowd contract is governed by the Federal
Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 through 15 (1988) (FAA). The Supremacy
Clause of the U.S. Constitution dictates that state law, including constitutional
law, is superseded to the extent it conflicts with federal law. U.S. Const. art. VI,
cl. 2; MAPCO Ammonia Pipeline v. State Bd. of Equal., 238 Neb. 565, 471
N.W.2d 734 (1991). Therefore, this court’s holdings that a predispute
agreement to compel arbitration is void are preempted to the extent they
conflicted with the FAA.”).
147
148

118
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by the Federal Arbitration Act.”153 Nevertheless, the court’s
syllogism is fatally flawed. The New York Court of Appeals,
a state court, freely admits that it is following the Second
Circuit’s interpretation of “evident partiality” under § 9,
which notes is in direct contradiction with that of a SCOTUS
opinion. 154 The court explained that “the Second Circuit
declined to follow the opinion of Commonwealth,
concluding that it did not have binding effect.”155 Here, the
Second Circuit is violating stare decisis. 156
More
specifically, under vertical stare decisis, the Second Circuit
is bound by SCOTUS decisions.157
The court did not state whether the agreement at
issue explicitly stated whether the FAA or state arbitration
rules applied. 158 Rather, the court deferred to interstate

U.S. Elecs., Inc. v. Sirius Satellite Radio, Inc., 958 N.E.2d 891, 892 (N.Y.
2011).
154
Id. at 892–93; see Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty
Co., 393 U.S. 145, 89 S. Ct. 337, 21 L.Ed.2d 301 (1968); Morelite Constr. Corp
(Div. of Morelite Elec. Serv., Inc.) v. New York City Dist. Council Carpenters
Benefit Funds, 748 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1984).
155
U.S. Elecs., Inc., 958 N.E.2d at 893.
156
Stare Decisis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “stare
decisis” as “the doctrine of precedent, under which a court must follow earlier
judicial decisions when the same points arise again in litigation”); Id. at 1366
(defining “precedent” as “a decided case that furnishes a basis for determining
later cases involving similar facts or issues”). This report does not examine the
Supreme Court’s reliance on state court or foreign tribunal precedents. Nor
does it examine how the Court determines whether a particular sentence in an
opinion is a binding holding necessary to the decision for purposes of stare
decisis or, rather, non-binding obiter dictum. See generally BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1177 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “obiter dictum” as a “judicial
comment made while delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is unnecessary
to the decision in the case and therefore not precedential (although it may be
considered persuasive).”).
157
Id. at 1537 (defining “vertical stare decisis” as “the doctrine that a court must
strictly follow the decisions handed down by higher courts within the same
jurisdiction”).
158
U.S. Elecs., Inc., 958 N.E.2d at 892 (“Petitioner U.S. Electronics, Inc. (USE)
seeks to vacate a unanimous arbitration award in favor of Sirius Satellite Radio,
Inc. (Sirius) arising out of a breach of contract dispute. USE, which had a
nonexclusive agreement with Sirius to distribute radio receivers . . .”).
153

119
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commerce to invoke the FAA. 159 Whether the court
misinterpreted “evident partiality” under § 9 of the FAA, and
whether the FAA is even applicable in this case are valid
inquiries. But they are beyond the scope of this Article. The
court did come to the proper conclusion that if the FAA does
govern an arbitration in state court, the FAA’s judicial
review standards apply in state court and preempt
application of different state law judicial review
standards.160
5. South Dakota
In Vold v. Broin & Assocs., Inc., the Supreme Court
of South Dakota cited the Commerce Clause as a reason for
holding that the FAA controlled the arbitration over the
dispute.161 Elaborating further, the dispute arose between
residents of South Dakota and Minnesota, which falls within
the purview of interstate commerce and allows federal law
to control.162 The contract between the parties did not call
for the FAA to apply, but rather the contract stipulated any
dispute should be decided in accordance with the
Construction Industry Arbitration Rules of the American
Arbitration Association (“AAA”). 163 The AAA specifies
that “[t]he parties shall be deemed to have made these rules
a part of their arbitration agreement whenever they have
provided for arbitration by AAA without specifying
particular rules.”164 The FAA grants contracting parties the
Id. at 892.
Id. at 892.
161
Vold v. Broin & Assocs., Inc., 699 N.W.2d 482, 487 (S.D. 2005).
162
Id. at 487.
163
Id. at 484.
164
Id. at 486 (“In addressing Vold’s arguments, we first turn to the Construction
Industry Arbitration Rules provided by the AAA. Rule R-1(a) states: The
parties shall be deemed to have made these rules a part of their arbitration
agreement whenever they have provided for arbitration by the [AAA] under its
Construction Industry Arbitration Rules. These rules and any amendment of
them shall apply in the form in effect at the time the administrative requirements
are met for a demand for arbitration or submission agreement received by the
AAA. The parties, by written agreement, may vary the procedures set forth in
the rules. After the appointment of the arbitrator, such modifications may be
159
160
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freedom “to authorize arbitrators to resolve such
questions.”165 Moreover, SCOTUS declared that “[t]here is
no federal policy favoring arbitration under a certain set of
procedural rules; the federal policy is simply to ensure
enforceability, according to the terms, or private agreements
to arbitrate” and that “[t]he FAA contains no express preemptive provision, nor does it reflect a congressional intent
to occupy the entire field of arbitration.”166 Notwithstanding,
this did not factor into the court’s analysis.167
The Supreme Court of South Dakota characterized
the lower court’s ruling as “spurious” and held that the
parties agreed to a “reasoned award.” 168 The court
disregarded the agreement between the parties and looked at
the FAA even though it was not expressly invoked in the
contract.169 The court then looked to the FAA, citing the
Commerce Clause, and held that it was limited in judicial
review to the grounds specified in § 10.170
B.
State Courts That Have Held That the
FAA Does Not Govern the Judicial Review Standard in
State Court.
1. Kentucky
In Atlantic Painting & Constructing Inc. v.
Nashville Bridge Co., the court openly defied the plain
meaning of the FAA by ruling that “[a]n arbitrator’s decision
made only with the consent of the arbitrator. In accord with R-21(b), “the
parties and the arbitrator,” during the preliminary hearing, “should discuss the
future conduct of the case, including clarification of the issues and claims, a
schedule for the hearings and any other preliminary matters.”).
165
Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1417 (2019).
166
Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford
Junior University, 489 U.S. 468, 476–78 (1989); see also Bernhardt v.
Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198 (1956) (opting to uphold applying the
arbitration law of the state to a contractual provision normally not covered by
the FAA).
167
Volt, 489 U.S. at 477–78.
168
Volt, 699 N.W.2d at 486–88.
169
Id.
170
Id.
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on a matter not submitted to him for his decision is void and
not binding on the courts or anybody else.”171 The court
maintained that because the contract stipulates that
Tennessee law governs, then Tennessee judicial review
standards apply.172 However, the court carved out judicial
review standards only, and left the possibility for the rest of
the FAA to be applicable open.173
On July 1, 1969, Nashville Bridge Company
entered into a contract with the Commonwealth of
Kentucky. 174 On September 10, 1969, Nashville Bridge
subcontracted with Atlantic Painting & Contracting Inc. and
Buckeye Painting & Sheeting Co., Inc., a Joint Venture, for
part of the work.175 There was a delay in the completion date,
and Atlantic/Buckeye calculated damages arising from this
delay. 176 Atlantic/Buckeye’s attorney notified Nashville
Bridge that it intended to submit its claim to arbitration.177
Nashville Bridge maintained that Atlantic/Buckeye’s claims
are outside the scope of arbitration outlined in their
contract.178
An interesting aspect of this case is that the court
held that interstate commerce does not preempt state law, but
rather gives the state concurrent jurisdiction. 179 It is not
clear where the court came to this, because it flies in the face
of the Interstate Commerce Clause.180 In Gibbons v. Ogden,
Atlantic Painting & Constructing Inc. v. Nashville Bridge Co., 670 S.W.2d
841, 845 (Ky. 1984).
172
Id.
173
Id. at 842–43.
174
Id. at 842.
175
Id.
176
Id.
177
Id. at 842–43.
178
Id. at 843.
179
Id. at 846–47 (“The procedural aspects are confined to federal cases.
Nashville Bridge conceded that nothing in the Act divests state courts of
concurrent jurisdiction in cases involving contracts in interstate commerce.”).
180
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (The Congress shall have the power “To regulate
Commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the
Indian Tribes.”).
171
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Chief Justice John Marshall held that Congress may control
all local activities that significantly affect interstate
commerce. 181 This reasoning has been reinforced by the
Court.182
The court then noted that the FAA has both a
procedural and substantive law for federal courts but
remained silent as to state courts. 183 This is because the
court is giving itself the judicial running room it needs to
implement its own policy on the law. The Supreme Court of
Kentucky completed a statutory somersault when it held that
vacatur under the FAA only applies to motions in federal
court.184 The court reasoned that the FAA only preempts
substantive law, and that judicial review standards are
procedural.185 There is a dearth of analysis in the opinion
because the court is simply trying to hide its judicial activism.
The court seems to be making some sort of Erie doctrine186
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116–17 (1941) (“[The Commerce
Clause] extends not only to those regulations which aid, foster and protect the
commerce, but embraces those which prohibit it.”).
183
Atlantic Painting and Construction Inc., 670 S.W.2d at 846 (“The federal
Arbitration Act covers both substantive law and a procedure for federal courts
to follow where a party to arbitration seeks to enforce or vacate an arbitration
award in federal court.”).
184
Id. at 846–47 (“But there is nothing in the federal Arbitration Act preempting
state jurisdiction of the contract action filed by Atlantic/Buckeye and nothing
in the Act remotely suggesting that the “motion to vacate” procedure, including
the three months’ time limitation set up for federal proceedings, has any
application at all to such state action. The federal Arbitration Act covers both
substantive law and a procedure for federal courts to follow where a party to
arbitration seeks to enforce or vacate an arbitration award in federal court.
The procedural aspects are confined to federal cases. Nashville Bridge
conceded that nothing in the Act divests state courts of concurrent jurisdiction
in cases involving contracts in interstate commerce.”) (emphasis added).
185
Id. at 846–47 (“There is a legion of cases before Southland Corp. all holding
that the substantive policy expressed in the provisions of the federal Arbitration
Act are preemptive.”).
186
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Gasperini v. Ctr. for
Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996) (“Under the Erie doctrine, federal
courts sitting in diversity apply state substantive law and federal procedural
law.”).
181
182
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argument, but purposefully does not mention it by name in
order to avoid unwanted attention to their baffling logic.
First, the Erie doctrine applies to federal courts—not state
courts. Second, there is no “‘motion to vacate’ procedure”
under the FAA, despite what the court says.187 A party or
parties may challenge an arbitration award under the FAA,
and the court may vacate the award under the grounds
enumerated in the statute. 188 The Supreme Court of
Kentucky is simply trying to impose their own views of what
the law should be, rather than what the law is.
2. South Carolina
In Henderson v. Summerville Ford-Mercury, the
Supreme Court of South Carolina makes some bold
statements about judicial review standards concerning
arbitration awards.189 The basis of the court’s analysis is
muddled, as it alleges that there is no difference between the
judicial review standards in state arbitration law and the
FAA. 190 The court then goes on to explain that “[t]he FAA’s
substantive provisions apply to arbitration in federal or state
courts, but a state’s procedural rules apply in state court
unless they conflict with or undermine the purpose of the
FAA.” 191 However, the court surreptitiously noted that
Summerville Ford-Mercury (“Dealer”) did not specify
whether the FAA or state arbitration law applied, and that
the lower court impliedly rejected the FAA because of state
arbitration law.192
Atlantic Painting and Construction Inc., 670 S.W.2d at 846.
9 U.S.C. § 10.
Henderson v. Summerville Ford-Mercury, Inc., 405 S.C. 440 (2013).
190
Id. at 447 (“For reasons discussed below, we conclude that it does not matter
which act is applied as the result would be the same.”).
191
Id. at 450.
192
Id. at 447–48 (“Initially, we note Dealer generally asserted at the hearing
that the FAA applied rather than the UAA, but it did not specifically discuss the
confirmation statutes of either act. Assuming the circuit court impliedly rejected
the application of the FAA based on its utilization of the UAA, we question the
sufficiency of Dealer’s briefed argument, as it does not address the confirmation
procedure under the FAA, 9 U.S.C.A. § 9, or how it has been prejudiced by the
187
188
189
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The court makes an illogical inference that because
§§ 3 and 4 of the FAA apply only in federal court, the FAA
does not preempt state procedural arbitration law.193 Section
4 of the FAA explicitly states it applies in federal court, and
§ 3 references “. . . any of the courts of the United
States. . . .”194 First, it is not definitive that judicial review
standards are procedural.195 Second, the court is engaging in
a preemption discussion with no analysis.196 The title of § 4
states, in part: “[P]etition to United States court having
jurisdiction for order to compel arbitration . . . .”197 Thus,
there is no preemption as the statute is providing rules for
how to bring arbitration claims in federal court. 198
Furthermore, following the court’s non-preemption claims,
it only looks at express preemption. 199 The court
conveniently forgets implied preemption.200
The court blatantly admits their defiance of the FAA
noting that the parties agreed to apply it to the arbitration,
but that the statute does not apply after an award is made.201
This is subject to reductio ad absurdum. If §§ 9 and 10 do

application of the UAA instead of the FAA.”) (citing Carolina Chloride, Inc. v.
Richland County, 394 S.C. 154, 714 S.E.2d 869 (2011) (holding an appellant
must show both an erroneous ruling and prejudice to warrant reversal)).
193
See Henderson, 405 S.C. at 448 (citing Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of
Trustees of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 477 (1989)); see generally
9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4.
194
9 U.S.C. § 3.
195
Henderson, 405 S.C. at 450.
196
Id.
197
9 U.S.C. § 4.
198
Id.
199
Henderson, 405 S.C. at 447–50.
200
See generally Max Birmingham, Up in the Air: Analyzing Whether the Clean
Air Act Preempts State Law Common Claims, 14 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 55, 58
(discussing express preemption and implied preemption); Henderson, 405 S.C.
at 447–50.
201
Henderson, 405 S.C. at 450 (“In the current appeal, although the arbitration
agreement stated the FAA would apply to the arbitration, it did not expressly
state the FAA would apply to the subsequent procedure for confirmation once
a final award was made.”).
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not apply, then they are rendered meaningless.202 A court
cannot review an arbitration award before an arbitrator
makes it.203 The Supreme Court of South Carolina does not
refer to any agreements by the parties that they would only
apply the FAA to the arbitration, but not the review of the
award. 204 Rather, this rationale was made to justify the
holding.
C.
State Courts That Have Issued Decisions
That Contain Broad Language Suggesting That the FAA
Does Not Govern the Judicial-Review Standard in State
Court
1. Alabama
a) Birmingham News Co. v. Horn
In Birmingham News Co. v. Horn, the Supreme
Court of Alabama noted that “[A] number of other state
appellate courts . . . recogniz[e] the applicability of the [FAA]
§ 10 standards in appeals in state courts from arbitration
awards” where the arbitration itself was governed by the
FAA. 205 In Birmingham, challenges were brought to
arbitration agreements between Birmingham News Co. and
six plaintiffs over claims of wrongful and illegal termination
of “dealer agreements.” 206 The plaintiffs initially sought
review by the Supreme Court of Alabama but were denied
relief because it was determined that the transactions met the

9 U.S.C. §§ 9, 10.
See 9 U.S.C. §§ 9, 10, 11.
Henderson, 405 S.C. at 450.
205
Birmingham News Co. v. Horn, 901 So. 2d 27, 46 (Ala. 2004); e.g., Hecla
Mining Co. v. Bunker Hill Co., 617 P.2d 861 (Idaho 1980) (quotations omitted);
Edward D. Jones & Co. v. Schwartz, 969 S.W.2d 788 (Mo. Ct. App.1998);
Dowd v. First Omaha Sec. Corp., 495 N.W.2d 36 (Neb. 1993); Allen & Co. v.
Shearson Loeb Rhoades, Inc., 489 N.Y.S.2d 500 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985), aff'd,
490 N.E.2d 850 (N.Y. 1986).”).
206
See Horn, 901 So. 2d at 30, 36–39 (“The plaintiffs are individuals who at
one time had ‘dealer agreements’ (hereinafter the ‘agreement’) with the News
to sell and distribute its newspapers to the public.”).
202
203
204
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threshold of interstate commerce. 207 The court ultimately
held that the state law judicial review standards under state
law are replicated in § 9 of the FAA. 208
It is noteworthy that the Birmingham court avoids
confronting the preemption issue. 209 Observing that the
FAA preempts substantive state law or policy, 210 it is
implied that the door is slightly ajar to arguments if there is
a procedural question about which judicial review standards
govern.211
b) Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc. v.
Honea, 55 So. 3d 1161, 1166–69 (Ala.
2010)
In Raymond James Financial Services, Inc. v.
Honea, the Supreme Court of Alabama “retreated from [its]
position” in Birmingham and held that § 10 of the FAA is a
procedural rule, not a substantive rule.212 The court cites the
decision in Hall Street Associates, L.L.C., but it is not clear

Id. at 30 (“This Court denied relief because the agreements affected interstate
commerce sufficiently to invoke the provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act,
9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (‘FAA’), to preempt state law barring the enforcement of
predispute arbitration agreements.”) (citing ex parte Stewart, 786 So.2d 464
(Ala.2000); Birmingham News v. Horn, 790 So.2d 939 (Ala. 2000)).
208
See Horn, 901 So. 2d at 46–47 (“This Court has adopted 9 U.S.C. § 10 as
applicable to an appeal of an arbitration award in this state, and we see no need
to retreat from that position. (It is to be noted that the three grounds listed in §
6-6-14 for vacating an arbitration award—fraud, partiality, or corruption in
making the award—are replicated in 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1) and (2).)”).
209
See generally Horn, 901 So. 2d 27.
210
Id. at 44 (“In cases governed by the FAA, the federal substantive law of
arbitration governs, despite contrary state law or policy.”) (quoting Maxus, Inc.
v. Sciacca, 598 So.2d 1376, 1379 (Ala.1992) (citations and quotations omitted)).
211
Horn, 901 So. 2d at 46 (“Arguably, a similar approach is implicit in Fuller
Construction, Maxus, and Mason . . . but we need not stumble over the
distinction between substantive law and procedural law in this particular
context.”) (citing H.L. Fuller Constr. Co. v. Indus. Dev. Bd of Town of Vincent,
590 So.2d 218 (Ala.1991); Maxus, Inc. v. Sciacca, 598 So.2d 1376, 1379 (Ala.
1992); Mason & Dixon Lines, Inc. v. Byrd, 601 So.2d 68 (Ala.1992)).
212
See supra notes 5 and 6 and accompanying text. Contra Horn, 901 So. 2d
at 46.
207
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how they came to this determination.213 Citing Hall Street
Associates, L.L.C., the Honea court has a footnote that cites
to an interpretation of the case by the Supreme Court of
California.214 As noted infra, California does what it wants
when it comes to arbitration. 215 And after SCOTUS
overturned the Supreme Court of California in Concepcion,
it is not necessary to follow their decision with regard to the
FAA. 216 Moreover, the Honea court then speaks out of both
sides of their mouth with regard to their reliance on Hall
Street Associates, L.L.C. 217 In the next footnote of the
opinion, the court furtively admits that SCOTUS did not
agree that an arbitration agreement automatically trumps §
10 of the FAA. 218 It is also not clear why the Supreme Court
See Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Honea, 55 So. 3d 1161, 1164–66
(Ala. 2010) (citing Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc. 552 U.S. 576, 579–
88 (2008)).
214
Honea, 55 So. 3d at 1171 n.4 (“In Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc.,
190 P.3d 586, 597–99, (2008), the Supreme Court of California likewise
concluded that § 10 was a procedural provision and that it accordingly did not
preempt California law governing the review of arbitration awards. That court
further held that parties in California may alter the usual scope of review applied
to arbitration awards by contract pursuant to California statutory and common
law, notwithstanding Hall Street., 190 P.3d at 589 (‘The California rule is that
the parties may obtain judicial review of the merits by express agreement.
There is a statutory as well as a contractual basis for this rule; one of the grounds
for review of an arbitration award is that “[t]he arbitrators exceeded their
powers.” ([Cal.Code Civ. Proc.,] §§ 1286.2, subd. (a)(4), 1286.6, subd. (b).’)
Here, the parties agreed that ‘[t]he arbitrators shall not have the power to
commit errors of law or legal reasoning, and the award may be vacated or
corrected on appeal to a court of competent jurisdiction for any such error.’”).
215
See infra Section V.C.2.
216
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 333 (2011); see e.g.,
Max Birmingham, California Dreamin’: Exploring the Golden State’s McGill
Rule, 4 WAYNE ST. U.J. BUS. L. 42 (discussing how the Supreme Court of
California has distorted its interpretation of the law to circumvent the Supreme
Court of the United States decision in AT & T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.).
217
See Honea, 55 So. 3d at 1171 n.5; see generally Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C.,
552 U.S. 576.
218
Honea, 55 So. 3d at 1171 n.5 (“Although, in Hall Street the Supreme Court
of the United States did not agree with the appellant that the general policy
requiring that arbitration agreements be enforced as they are written should
trump the plain language of the FAA indicating that the grounds enumerated in
213
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of Alabama even decided to discuss this subject in dicta
since it was not at issue before the court. 219 While this
language seems to indicate a willingness to break from the
precedent set forth in Birmingham, the wishy-washy nature
of why they should may be inclination that they may not
overturn if they hear persuasive arguments.
2. California
Yet again, California has conjured up its own rules
regarding arbitration. 220
In Cable Connection, Inc.
v. DirecTV, Inc., the Supreme Court of California held that
§ 10 of the FAA is a procedural rule and that it does not
preempt California state law governing arbitrations.221 In a
bewildering statement, the court asserts that “we do not
believe the Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. majority intended
to declare a policy with preemptive effect in all cases
involving interstate commerce.”222 In a footnote, the court
doubles down and maintains that “such an effect would be
sweeping indeed in the commercial setting.” 223
Notwithstanding, the court completely contradicts itself
when it freely admits that “[t]he FAA governs agreements in
contracts involving interstate commerce, like those in this
case.” 224 The question before the Supreme Court of
California arose out of a substantial dispute between
DIRECTV and its dealers in four states who claimed that the

§ 10 are the exclusive grounds upon which an arbitration award may be vacated,
552 U.S. at 585–86, it has, even post-Hall Street, reiterated that courts and
arbitrators must “‘give effect to the contractual rights and expectations of the
parties.’”) (citing Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., 559
U.S. 662, 682 (2010) (quoting Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of
Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989))).
219
See Honea, 55 So. 3d at 1168–70.
220
See generally Birmingham, supra note 216.
221
Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 190 P.3d 586 (Cal. 2008).
222
Id. at 599.
223
Id. at 599; contra Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265,
269–70 (1995) (describing how SCOTUS held that a commercial transaction
between two parties based in Alabama rose to the level of interstate commerce).
224
Cable Connection, Inc., 190 P.3d at 597 n.14.
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company had wrongfully withheld commissions and
assessed improper charges.225
In Cable Connection, Inc., the court paid due
deference to a previous case, Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase,
Inc., which held that if the agreement between the parties
limits the arbitrator’s authority by requiring that the award
follow the law, judicial review of the merits is possible.226
Notwithstanding, nothing in the agreement between the
parties in Cable Connection, Inc. contained language which
the court says was necessary for merits review.227
The agreement was poorly drafted. It stated, in part,
“The arbitrators shall apply California substantive law to the
proceeding, except to the extent Federal substantive law
would apply to any claim.”228 The arbitration clause further
specified: “This Section and any arbitration conducted
hereunder shall be governed by the United States Arbitration
Act (9 U.S.C. § 1, et seq.).” 229 The part of California
substantive law seems to serve no purpose other than to
provide fodder for litigation. Nonetheless, the Cable
Connection, Inc. court does not illustrate where in the
agreement the parties agreed to judicial review of the
merits. 230 In fact, the judicial review section of the
agreement between the parties replicates that of the FAA,
even citing §§ 10 and 11 of the statute. 231 California has
done whatever it wants when it comes to arbitration and will
continue to do so.
3. Texas
The Supreme Court of Texas does not explicitly
hold that state arbitration law concerning judicial review
standards preempts the FAA, but it stops just short of doing
Id. at 590.
Id. at 600; Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, 832 P.2d 899 (Cal. 1992).
227
Cable Connection, Inc., 190 P.3d at 592 nn.3–7.
228
Id. at 590 n.3.
229
Id. at 1377 n.3.
230
Id. at 592 nn.3–7.
231
Id. at 592 nn.4–7.
225
226
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so.232 In Nafta Traders, Inc. v. Quinn, the court discerned
that even if interstate commerce is involved, thereby
implicating the FAA, it does not mean that state arbitration
law is preempted.233 For bye, the court went so far as to say
that state arbitration law has to expressly exempt itself from
the matter or have an enforceability requirement not found
in the FAA.234 First, it is highly doubtful that Texas, or any
state, will pass arbitration law that expressly states that their
judicial review standards are preempted by the FAA.
“Express preemption occurs when Congress explicitly states
that federal law is the exclusive law and state law is to be
disregarded.” 235 There is no precedent where a state has
preempted itself to federal law. Second, the court seems to
imply that there is only express preemption with regard to
the FAA and ignores implied preemption as the Supreme
Court of South Carolina did.236
Nafta Traders, Inc. v. Quinn, 339 S.W.3d 84, 97–98 (Tex. 2011) (“We have
explained it this way: The FAA only preempts the TAA if: (1) the agreement is
in writing, (2) it involves interstate commerce, (3) it can withstand scrutiny
under traditional contract defenses under state law, and (4) state law affects the
enforceability of the agreement. . . . The mere fact that a contract affects
interstate commerce, thus triggering the FAA, does not preclude enforcement
under the TAA as well. For the FAA to preempt the TAA, state law must refuse
to enforce an arbitration agreement that the FAA would enforce, either because
(1) the TAA has expressly exempted the agreement from coverage, or (2) the
TAA has imposed an enforceability requirement not found in the FAA.”) (citing
In re D. Wilson Constr. Co., 196 S.W.3d 774, 780 (Tex. 2006) (citations,
brackets, emphasis, and internal quotation marks omitted)).
233
Nafta Traders, Inc., 339 S.W.3d at 97–98 (“When, as in this case, an
arbitration agreement is covered by both state and federal law, state law is
preempted “to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law—that is, to
the extent that it ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’” Having concluded that the TAA
permits parties to agree to expanded judicial review of arbitration awards, we
must determine whether the FAA, which under Hall Street precludes such
agreements, preempts Texas law. That is, do such agreements thwart
Congress’s purposes and objectives in the FAA?”).
234
Id.
235
Max Birmingham, Up in the Air: Analyzing Whether the Clean Air Act
Preempts State Law Common Claims, 14 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 55, 58 (2019).
236
See generally Nafta Traders, Inc., 339 S.W.3d at 97–98.
232
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VI.

Public Policy
A.
Standing
In Hall Street Associates, L.L.C., there is a
significant standing issue that SCOTUS somehow
overlooked.237 The agreement incorporated § 7 of the FAA
regarding the power of the arbitrator to compel the
attendance of witnesses but it did not otherwise “expressly
invoke [the] FAA.”238 The FAA itself does not provide for
federal subject matter jurisdiction.239 Thus, there needed to
be an independent basis for proceeding in federal court.
In a footnote, SCOTUS states that “[b]ecause the
FAA is not jurisdictional, there is no merit in the argument
that enforcing the arbitration agreement’s judicial review
provision would create federal jurisdiction by private
contract.”240 Rather, “[t]he issue is entirely about the scope
of judicial review permissible under the FAA.”241 SCOTUS
cannot address the scope of judicial review if there is no
standing. 242 Addressing the footnote itself, this is an
illogical reason as to why standing is not an issue. If there
Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc. 552 U.S. 576, 590 (2008).
Id. (“While it is true that the agreement does not expressly invoke FAA § 9,
§ 10, or § 11, and none of the various motions to vacate or modify the award
expressly said that the parties were relying on the FAA. . .”; We are, however,
in no position to address the question now, beyond noting the claim of relevant
case management authority independent of the FAA.”).
239
Id. at 582 n.2 (“Because the FAA is not jurisdictional, there is no merit in
the argument that enforcing the arbitration agreement's judicial review
provision would create federal jurisdiction by private contract. The issue is
entirely about the scope of judicial review permissible under the FAA.”).
240
Id. at 590.
241
Id.
242
Under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, standing doctrine requires that a
court must be presented with a “case” or “controversy” before it exercises
jurisdiction. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. As set forth in Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992), a plaintiff must show: (1) he has
“suffered an ‘injury in fact’” that is “(a) concrete and particularized . . . and (b)
‘actual or imminent, not “conjectural” or “hypothetical”’; (2) the injury is
“‘fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant’”; and (3) it is
“‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed
by a favorable decision.’”
237
238
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is no merit in the argument that enforcing the arbitration
agreement would create federal jurisdiction, and the judicial
review provision does not create federal jurisdiction, then it
is not clear how one may bring a case in federal court.
State courts have invoked the FAA when it was not
expressly invoked in the agreement at dispute by citing
interstate commerce. 243 When state courts do this, they
essentially confess that they do not have jurisdiction to hear
the case in question. Interstate commerce enables federal
courts to exercise jurisdiction over disputes that center on the
FAA given that the FAA “bestow[s] no federal jurisdiction
but rather requir[es] an independent jurisdictional basis” to
file in federal court.244 In Hall Street Associates, L.L.C., the
Court seemingly admits that jurisdiction may have been in
state court, yet it does not matter which court enforced the
arbitration.245 Needless to say, just because an arbitration
can be enforced in state court does not mean that a federal
court has jurisdiction over that arbitration. Moreover,
SCOTUS’ previously mentioned stance is antithetical to this
Article. SCOTUS emphasizes that contracts to arbitrate are
“‘valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,’” so long as they
involve commerce, but fails to appreciate the drastic
ramifications if a party seeks enforcement in state court
versus federal court. 246 Until SCOTUS decides whether,
when the FAA governs an arbitration, the FAA’s judicial
review standards apply in state court and preempt
application of different state law judicial review standards,
See, e.g., Forged Components, Inc. v. Guzman, 409 S.W.3d 91, 98 (Tex.
App. 2013); N.J.R. Associates v. Tausend, 973 N.E.2d 730, 732–33 (N.Y.
2012); Zabinski v. Bright Acres Associates, 553 S.E.2d 110, 594–96 (S.C.
2001).
244
Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C., 552 U.S. at 582.
245
Id. (“But in cases falling within a court’s jurisdiction, the Act makes
contracts to arbitrate ‘valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,’ so long as their
subject involves ‘commerce.’ § 2. And this is so whether an agreement has a
broad reach or goes just to one dispute, and whether enforcement be sought in
state court or federal.”) (emphasis added).
246
Id.
243
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then the forum battle of state court versus federal court will
be of the utmost importance in these actions.
B.
Floodgates/Hostility
Towards
Arbitration
Justice Scalia, who authored the majority opinion in
Concepcion, determined that states cannot create arbitration
procedures that are inconsistent with the FAA. 247 Justice
Scalia observed that the floodgates would open if states were
allowed to enforce arbitration agreements on the availability
of class proceedings because states would also demand the
ability to enforce other arbitration procedures such as
discovery.248
Historically, American courts greeted arbitration
with hostility.249 This hostility was inherited from English
courts. 250 It originated at least in part because English
judges’ fees reflected the number of cases they decided.251
Arbitration threatened to reduce their workload.252 English
courts were also reluctant to concede their jurisdiction over
various disputes. 253 In America, the hostility towards
arbitration abated as there was an exponential increase in
business disputes. 254
Business leaders called for
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 351 (2011).
Id. at 341–42.
249
Preston D. Wigner, The United States Supreme Court’s Expansive Approach
to the Federal Arbitration Act: A Look at the Past, Present, and Future of
Section 2, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 1499, 1502 (1995); see, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 96,
68th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1924).
250
See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991) (“[The
Federal Arbitration Act’s] purpose was to reverse the longstanding judicial
hostility to arbitration agreements that had existed at English common law and
had been adopted by American courts . . . .”).
251
Wigner, supra note 249, at 1502.
252
Id.
253
H.R. REP. NO. 96, supra note 249 at 1–2; David P. Pierce, The Federal
Arbitration Act: Conflicting Interpretations of Its Scope, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 623,
625 (1992).
254
See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24 (“[The Federal Arbitration Act’s] purpose was to
reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that had
existed at English common law and had been adopted by American courts . . . .”).
247
248
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standardized procedures to address these disputes.255 Before
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted in 1938,
federal courts would apply, to some degree, the state court
procedures of the state where the federal court sat pursuant
to the Conformity Act of 1872.256 A judge in New York
discerned that businesspeople “were willing to do almost
anything” to avoid the chaotic procedures in the court
system.257
Recently, one state court discerned that state
standards for judicial review of arbitration awards are
procedural rules that do not frustrate the FAA’s substantive
goal of enforcing the underlying arbitration agreements.258
Sections 9–11 of the FAA require courts to confirm
arbitration awards, subject to certain narrow grounds for
vacatur or modification, upon request by a party to the
arbitration so long as the parties agreed for a court judgment
on the award, specified the court, and applied within one
year.259
States hostile to arbitration may undermine FAAgoverned arbitration agreements by applying their own, or
different, law judicial review standards. If states are hostile
to arbitration, or are pushed to enact legislation, such as what
occurred in New York, 260 informal arbitration would be
rendered “merely a prelude to a more cumbersome and timeconsuming judicial review process,” thereby “bring[ing]
Id.; William L. Ransom, The Organization of the Courts for the Better
Administration of Justice, 2 CORNELL L. REV. 186, 199 (1917).
256
4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1002 n.19 (3rd ed. 1998) (quoting Conformity Act of June
1, 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 1970 (1872)).
257
William L. Ransom, The Organization of the Courts for the Better
Administration of Justice, 2 CORNELL L. REV. 186, 199 (1917).
258
State v. Philip Morris, Inc., 225 Md. App. 214, 237–39 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2015).
259
9 U.S.C. §§ 9–11.
260
See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24 (“[The Federal Arbitration Act’s] purpose was to
reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that had
existed at English common law and had been adopted by American courts[.]”).
255

135

Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2022

41

Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [2022], Art. 4
[Vol. 22: 95, 2022]

You Be the Judge
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL

arbitration theory to grief in post-arbitration process.” 261
Indeed, “[a]ny other reading [would] open[ ] the door to . . .
full-bore legal and evidentiary appeals,” including even de
novo review.262 If the FCC allows states to implement their
own judicial review standards when the FAA governs an
arbitration, the FAA would be toothless as states could
nullify the arbitration awards through their own standards.263
VII.
Reductio Ad Absurdum
Some state courts have developed their own
interpretation as to what constitutes interstate commerce,
and thus disallowed the FAA from being the controlling
statute.264 This is frightening. As discussed infra, SCOTUS
has held an extremely broad interpretation of interstate
commerce. 265 Furthermore, state courts have also held
extremely broad interpretations of interstate commerce in
order to apply the FAA.266
In a complete contrast from the New York Court of
Appeals’ decision in US Elecs., Inc.,267 a lower New York
state court held the FAA is inapplicable because the contract
did not affect interstate commerce, despite the fact the alarm
company operated in nine states.268 The use of mandatory
arbitration clauses in consumer contracts is prohibited under

Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008); LaPine
Technology Corp. v. Kyocera, 341 F.3d 884, 998 (9th Cir. 1997).
262
Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C., 552 U.S. 576; 9 U.S.C. §§ 9–11.
263
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 US 105, 118–19 (“And the fact that
the provision is contained in a statute that “seeks broadly to overcome judicial
hostility to arbitration agreements,” Allied-Bruce, 513 U. S., at 272–273, which
the Court concluded in Allied-Bruce counseled in favor of an expansive reading
of § 2, gives no reason to abandon the precise reading of a provision that
exempts contracts from the FAA’s coverage.”).
264
See supra Parts V.A–B.
265
See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995);
American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 570 U.S. 228 (2013); Green
Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
266
See generally Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc., 513 U.S. 265.
267
See supra Part V.A.4.
268
Schiffer v. Slomin’s, Inc., 970 N.Y.S.2d 856, 864 (N.Y. 2013).
261
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New York General Business Law § 399-c.269 In stunningly
brazen judicial activism, the New York state court openly
defied SCOTUS. 270 The Schiffer court conceded “the
holdings in more recent United States Supreme Court cases
(AT&T Mobility, Marmet and Nitro-Lift) are conceptually
inconsistent” with New York arbitration law, yet vowed to
continue to apply New York common law until the Supreme
Court “expressly overrule[d]” that law.271 What is intriguing
is the New York state court did not attempt to hide its judicial
activism. 272 Rather, it laid down a challenge and dared
SCOTUS to take up the case and explicitly rule on this
issue.273
Similar to the Schiffer court resisting SCOTUS, we
have seen a similar instance in California.274
After SCOTUS struck down the Discover Bank
Rule, the Supreme Court of California created the McGill
Rule.275 The McGill Rule holds provisions in pre-dispute
arbitration agreements waiving the parties’ right to seek
“public injunctive relief” in any forum are contrary to public
policy and are thus unenforceable. 276 The reasoning
displayed by New York and California is subject to reductio
ad absurdum (“reduction to absurdity”).277 If SCOTUS has
to “expressly overrule” every state law regarding arbitration,
then states would be able to enact a slew of laws and realize
the chance of them being taken up by the High Court is
269

N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 399-c (McKinney 2014).
Judicial Activism, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A
philosophy of judicial decision-making whereby judges allow their personal
views about public policy, among other factors, to guide their decisions.”).
271
Schiffer, 970 N.Y.S.2d at 864.
272
Id.
273
Id.
274
See McGill v. Citibank, 393 P.3d 85 (Cal. 2017).
275
Id.
276
Id. at 97.
277
Reductio Ad Absurdum, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“In
logic, disproof of an argument by showing that it leads to a ridiculous
conclusion.”).
270
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rare.278 As it relates specifically to judicial review standards,
states would then be able to enact whatever standards they
decide upon—creating a patchwork quilt of state laws.279
VIII. Conclusion
As we see, courts are now interpreting the FAA as
they see fit in order to dispense their own brand of justice.
The FAA was originally enacted to repel “widespread
judicial hostility to arbitration agreements.” 280 States that
are hostile to arbitration are able to undermine FAA
governed arbitration agreements by mandating more judicial
review standards of arbitration awards than the FAA
authorizes. Aside from flouting SCOTUS’ decisions
concerning FAA objectives, it can have deleterious effects
from a pragmatic perspective. There may be an increase in
the cost of arbitration if awards are allowed to easily be
challenged in court, thus eliminating one of the unique
selling points of arbitration: “a national policy favoring
arbitration with just the limited review needed to maintain
arbitration’s essential virtue of resolving disputes
straightaway.”281
SCOTUS has reinforced the legal principle that the
FAA judicial review standards are stringent, and there is a
high burden to set aside an arbitration award.282 In Oxford
Health, the Court held that so long as a dispute was within
the arbitrators’ jurisdiction, a decision “‘even arguably
Adam Feldman, Empiracle SCOTUS: Follow the experts in framing
petitions for cert, SCOTUS BLOG (Nov. 19, 2018, 1:53 PM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/11/empirical-scotus-follow-the-experts-inframing-petitions-for-cert (“With well over 7,000 annual petitions for certiorari,
the justices and their clerks must wade through what may seem like an infinite
number of pages in order to pare down to the 70 or so cases they hear in a
term.”).
279
Id.
280
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U. S. 333, 339 (2011); see also
Birmingham, supra note 200.
281
Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U. S. 576, 588 (2008); see also
Oxford Health Plans v. Sutter, 569 U.S. 564, 568 (2013).
282
Oxford Health Plans, 569 U.S. at 569.
278
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construing or applying the contract’ must stand, regardless
of a court’s view of its (de)merits.”283
Following the Court’s jurisprudence, for an
arbitration award to be set aside it must fall within one of the
narrow exceptions in §§ 9–11 of the FAA.284 In other words,
the arbitrators must have willfully “abandoned their
interpretive role,” not just merely “misinterpreted the
contract.”285 Thus, a state cannot impose its own judicial
review standards. SCOTUS has remarked that an error, even
a serious error, is not sufficient to set aside an arbitration
award.286 While this may be a harsh light, parties know what
the circumstances are and “[t]he potential for . . . mistakes is
the price of agreeing to arbitration.” 287 Even the Second
Circuit offered a stark warning to those who seek arbitration
instead of pursuing their claims in court:
“Arbitration may or may not be a desirable
substitute for trial in courts; as to that the parties must decide
in each instance. But when they have adopted it, they must
be content with its informalities; they may not hedge it about
with those procedural limitations which it is precisely its
purpose to avoid. They must content themselves with looser
approximations to the enforcement of their rights than those
that the law accords them, when they resort to its
machinery.”288
SCOTUS reinforced this by remarking “[i]t is [their]
construction of the contract which was bargained for,” and
thus “the courts have no business overruling [them]” because

Id.
9 U.S.C. §§ 9–11.
285
Oxford Health Plans, 569 U.S. at 571.
286
Id. at 564.
287
Id. at 572–573.
288
Hecla Mining Co. v. Bunker Hill Co., 617 P.2d 861, 866 (Idaho 1980) (citing
American Almond Prods. Co. v. Consol. Pecan Sales Co., 144 F.2d 448, 451
(2d Cir. 1944)).
283
284
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“[t]he potential for . . . mistakes is the price of agreeing to
arbitration.”289
Some may argue as to whether some of the state
courts made the proper analysis as to whether the FAA
should have governed the arbitration, or if the interstate
commerce clause is being interpreted too broadly in this
context. Nonetheless, this is beyond the scope of this article.
If the FAA governs an arbitration, the FAA’s judicial review
standards apply. The courts that have held otherwise are
legislating from the bench in order to impose their own
public policy. The FAA has extremely specific language
about judicial review standards.290 It is wholly disingenuous
to take the position that the FAA does not preempt state
judicial review standards when it governs an arbitration.
SCOTUS has not yet ruled as to whether the FAA preempts
state laws that permit state courts to subject arbitration
awards to different standards of judicial review.291 If this
issue does come before the Court, it will hopefully affirm
this Article.

Oxford Health Plans, 569 U.S. at 572–573.
See 9 U.S.C. §§ 9–11.
291
See Nitro-Lift Techs. v. Howard, 568 U. S. 17, 21 (2012); Hall St. Assocs.,
L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U. S. 576, 581–82 (2008).
289
290
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